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Casenote

Blakely v. Washington: Criminal Sentencing
and the Sixth Amendment Limitation on
Judicial Factfinding

In Blakely v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that Washington's state criminal sentencing procedure did not comply
A
with the defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.2
criminal defendant has the right to have a jury decide all facts legally
essential to punishment.3 This decision is important for its impact on
criminal sentencing procedures, especially regarding its implications for
the federal sentencing guidelines.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1998 Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. kidnapped his estranged wife
Yolanda from their home in Grant County, Washington. He used duct
tape to restrain her and forced her, at knifepoint, into a wooden box in
the bed of his pickup truck. During the abduction, Blakely pleaded with
Yolanda to dismiss her divorce suit and related trust proceedings against
him. The couple's thirteen-year-old son, Ralphy, returned home from

1. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2. Id. at 2538.
3. Id. at 2543.
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school, and Blakely ordered him to drive behind the truck in another car.
Blakely threatened that he would use a shotgun to harm Yolanda if
Ralphy did not comply. Ralphy followed the truck to a gas station.
While both vehicles were stopped, Ralphy escaped and sought help.
Blakely drove on with Yolanda, still imprisoned in the wooden box, to a
friend's house in Montana. The friend called the police who then
arrested Blakely.4
In a plea
Blakely was charged with first-degree kidnapping.
agreement, the State of Washington reduced the charge to second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. Blakely
later agreed to an additional charge of second-degree assault, involving
domestic violence. 5 He pleaded guilty to the charge of second-degree
kidnapping, which is a class B felony, admitting the elements of the
charge and the allegations of domestic violence and use of a firearm.
Blakely did not admit any other relevant facts.6
Washington state sentencing law provided that "[n]o person convicted
of a [class B] felony shall be punished by confinement.., exceeding...
a term of ten years."7 Other provisions of Washington's Sentencing
Reform Act 8 further limited the sentence. Second-degree kidnapping
with a firearm bears a standard sentence range of forty-nine to fiftythree months, which is less than ten years?
A judge may, however, impose a sentence that exceeds the standard
range if the judge discovers "'substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an exceptional sentence."' 1 ° When a judge sentences a
defendant to a sentence that exceeds the standard range, the judge must
support the sentence with findings of fact and conclusions of law."
The State recommended a sentence within the standard range which
was forty-nine to fifty-three months. The facts in Blakely's plea
corresponded to the state's guided maximum sentence.12 The court,
however, sentenced him to an additional thirty-seven months after
hearing Yolanda's testimony describing the kidnapping and after making
a judicial determination that the petitioner acted with "deliberate

4.
5.
is not
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2534.
Id. at 2535 n.2 (noting "The 14-month sentence on that count ran concurrently and
relevant here.").
Id. at 2534-35.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(b).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2)).
Id.
Id.
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cruelty."" This determinator gave the court grounds, under state law
relating to domestic violence cases, for a departure from the standard
sentence. "4
Blakely objected, and the judge held a three-day bench hearing, which
included testimony from Blakely, Yolanda, Ralphy, a police officer, and
medical experts. Subsequent to the hearing, the judge issued thirty-two
findings of fact and concluded that the initial sentence of ninety months
should stand. 5
Blakely appealed and contended that the trial judge's sentencing
procedure deprived him of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to
have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the facts that were
legally applicable to his sentence. The Washington State Court of
again, the Washington
Appeals affirmed, and when Blakely appealed
6
Supreme Court denied discretionary review.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 7 In its majority opinion, the
Court reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the petitioner's
Sixth Amendment right was violated by the imposition of an exceptional
sentence based on facts not found by a jury.'"
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State ... and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 9 Generally,
the Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants the right to trial by
jury. Juries decide the verdict on the charged offenses, and judges
impose sentences as punishment.
Background: The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing
In Williams v. New York,2 defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder. The trial judge imposed the death sentence despite the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment. The judge explained the sentence
enhancement was justified by additional information and was authorized
by statute. Specifically, the judge described the shocking details of the
crime and spoke about his own belief in defendant's guilt. The judge

A.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2535-36.
Id. at 2536.
Id.
Id. at 2538.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

20. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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reasoned that the investigation had uncovered many material details
about defendant's background and prior convictions. These facts,
although relevant to punishment, could not have been brought before the
jury for consideration.21
The Supreme Court discussed how there were both historical and
practical reasons for the distinction between the rules governing trial
and sentencing procedure.22 Additionally, a sentencing judge has the
task of determining the extent of punishment and having the most
information possible is essential for setting an appropriate sentence.2
The Court held that even though the potential for abuse arises when a
judge is choosing the appropriate sentence, especially when the choice
is between life imprisonment and death, judicial discretion is nevertheless constitutional.24 A judge does not violate the Due Process Clause,
which incorporates the Sixth Amendment,
merely by considering
25
information that was not put before a jury.
In In re Winship,2" appellant was a twelve-year-old boy who had
stolen money from a woman's purse. The trial judge reasoned that while
the evidence might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, such
proof was not required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge
ordered the boy to be placed in a training school for an initial period of
eighteen months.2
The Supreme Court discussed the historical precedence of requiring
that a guilty conviction be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.28
This "safeguard" reduces the risk of guilty convictions based on errors
of fact.29 The Court reversed and expressly held that the Due Process
Clause, which incorporates the Sixth Amendment, requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute a crime.3 ° This
rule of law applies to children as well as to adults being charged with
crimes.31

21. Id. at 242-44.
22. Id. at 246.
23. Id. at 247.
24. Id. at 252.
25. Id.
26. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. Id. at 360.
28. Id. at 361.
29. Id. at 362-63.
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id. at 365.
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In United States v. Gaudin,32 Gaudin was convicted of making
material false statements on federal loan documents. 33 The trial court
instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required the government to
prove the materiality of the alleged false statements, but that this
decision was a matter for the court rather than the jury. The judge
ruled that the statements were material.34
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which he reiterated
the pedigree of Sixth Amendment precedent.35 The Court reasoned
that the jury is not a "mere factfinder" but rather a body that "appl[ies]
the law to those facts and draw[s] the ultimate conclusion of guilt or
innocence."3 As such, the Court held that the trial judge's act of
refusing to let the jury determine the materiality of the false statements
infringed on respondent's right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.3 7
In Jones v.United States, 8 Nathaniel Jones, along with two other
people, robbed and assaulted two men. A grand jury indicted Jones and
his accomplices on counts relating to carjacking and using a firearm in
a crime of violence. The trial judge's jury instructions referred only to
the first paragraph of one of the statutes allegedly violated. The judge
39
did not instruct the jury to consider "serious bodily injury," an

element listed in the statute's subsection. The jury returned a guilty
verdict on both counts for Jones. The presentence report recommended
a sentence of twenty-five years because one of the victims had serious
bodily injury. Jones objected to the recommended sentence because
"serious bodily injury" had not been considered by the jury. The trial
court imposed the twenty-five year sentence, reasoning that a preponderance of evidence supported the allegation of serious bodily injury.4 °
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's rationale.4 ' The
element of serious bodily injury was a fact that required consideration
by the jury. A finding of serious bodily injury could result in a much
higher sentence, thus making the element more than just a sentencing
factor.4 The Court reversed and held that while it was not always

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

515 U.S. 506 (1995).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 522-23.
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 229-31.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232-33.
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necessary for every fact having a bearing on sentencing to be put before
a jury, in this case, the statute's elements 43must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and submitted to the jury.
B.

The Modern Apprendi Rule

The United States modeled its criminal law sentencing system after
a historical tradition that required jury trials for accusation and
sentencing hearings for criminal defendants. The Court acknowledged44
this rich history of sentencing tradition in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
In Apprendi petitioner Apprendi fired shots into the home of an AfricanAmerican family, which had recently moved to a neighborhood that had
previously been all white. A grand jury indictment charged Apprendi
with several offenses, including shooting and unlawful possession of
weapons. None of the charges referred to the state's hate crime
statute.4 5
Apprendi pled guilty to three counts for which there were statutory
sentencing ranges. The State reserved the right to request an enhanced
sentence based on one of the offenses being committed for racially biased
reasons. Apprendi likewise reserved the right to challenge the enhancement as a constitutional infringement. The trial judge accepted the
guilty pleas and held a hearing to determine Apprendi's purpose in
committing the crimes. The judge held that the hate crime enhancement
applied because there was evidence supporting a finding of racial
bias.46
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the sentence
enhancement on one of the counts was constitutionally permissible since
the enhanced sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. 7 The Court
discussed the importance of the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee and
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause relating to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.4" A sentencing factor is a fact that is not put
before a jury but that could affect the judge's decision in imposing a
sentence. 49 A sentencing factor describes a circumstance that is either
aggravating or mitigating that relates to a specific sentence within a

43. Id. at 248, 252.
44. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
45. Id. at 469.
46. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-71.
47. Id. at 474.
48. Id. at 476-77.
49. Id. at 485 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that an
enhanced sentence based on facts not found by the jury raises serious constitutional
concerns)).
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range allowed by the jury's finding.5" A sentence enhancement, on the
other hand, increases a sentence beyond the authorized statutory
maximum sentence.51 Because a sentence enhancement is virtually the
same as an element of a greater offense, it falls within the category of
things a jury is required to find.52
Without specially ruling on the federal sentencing guidelines,53 the
Court held that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must
be considered by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.54 The
sentencing judge had transformed Apprendi's sentence from one related
to a second-degree offense into one related to a first-degree offense. This
enhancement had more than just a nominal effect and was, therefore,
unconstitutional.55 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor warned that the
Apprendi decision established a "bright-line rule" that effectively limited
the power of elected representatives to define criminal offenses and
related sentences. 5
The Apprendi rule was applied in Ring v. Arizona.5 7 There, Ring
participated in the armed robbery of a courier van during which the
driver was killed. The jury was instructed on premeditated murder and
felony murder. The jury convicted Ring of felony murder occurring
during the course of armed robbery. No evidence placed Ring at the
scene of the crime; thus, unless further findings were made, Ring could
not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum for first-degree
murder under the statute.58
At Ring's sentencing hearing, his accomplice testified that Ring had
been at the scene of the crime and shot the driver. Based on this
testimony, the judge found there were aggravating factors that affected
Ring's sentence and imposed the death penalty.59 Ring appealed his
sentence, and ultimately the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to clarify the reasoning and rule of Apprendi.6 °
The Court considered the question of whether a judge may find
aggravating factors or whether the Sixth Amendment jury trial

50. Id. at 494 n.19.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
54. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
55. Id. at 494-95.
56. Id. at 525.
57. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
58. Id. at 589, 591-92.
59. Id. at 593-95.
60. Id. at 596.
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guarantee requires aggravating factors to be determined by a jury.61
Because these factors effectively created elements of a greater offense,
the Court held that they must be found by a jury in order to be
consistent with the Sixth Amendment.
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE
63

In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether the judge's imposition of an additional thirty-seven
months to petitioner's sentence violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury.64 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion
comprised of both liberal and conservative justices, an unusual five to
four split. 5
In its analysis the Court revisited Apprendi as a foundation for the
rule regarding the constitutionality standards for criminal sentencing.66
The maximum sentence a judge may impose on a criminal defendant is
that which is based on the facts "reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant." 7 The majority stated that the maximum is not the
maximum sentence that may be imposed after finding additional facts,
but instead, the maximum sentence that may be imposed without
finding any additional facts.68
The Court held that a judge who imposes a sentence based on facts not
69
found by the jury has exceeded the proper authority of sentencing.
There is no distinction among a judge's authority in enhancing a
sentence based on finding a specific fact, one of many specific facts, or
any fact that could be aggravating. In any case, the judge is finding a
fact that the jury's verdict does not authorize.7 ° Justice Scalia's
interpretation of the Apprendi rule requires a jury to hear every legally
essential fact.7 ' In this way, the right to trial by jury ensures the
people's ultimate control of the judicial branch.72 The decision in

61. Id. at 597.
62. Id. at 609.
63. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
64. Id. at 2540.
65. Id. at 2534.
66. Id. at 2536.
67. Id. at 2537. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee applied to Arizona's sentencing factors).
68. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2538.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2539.
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"judge's authority to sentence
Apprendi reinforces the notion that the
73
verdict"
jury's
the
from
wholly
derives
Justice Scalia repeated that the main issue splitting the Blakely
74
majority and the dissents was where to draw the constitutional line.
Justice Scalia noted that the Court was not split over the issue of
whether the Constitution limited the authority of the states to categorize
certain elements as sentencing factors. 78 Furthermore, the Court's
decision in Blakely did not express an opinion on the federal sentencing
guidelines.7"
Justice Scalia reasoned that two alternatives exist for critics of
Apprendi.77 First, if a jury is not required to make every finding of
fact, then a jury would only need to find the facts chosen by a legislature
as elements of the crime. This scheme would allow judges to find any
facts a legislature labels as sentencing factors, no matter how much
these facts may enhance the sentence.7 ' The second alternative is that
legislatures may set "legally essential sentencing factors within limits"
without allowing the law to go too far into the realm of sentencing
authority possessed by the judge.79 Justice Scalia argued that this
For example, petitioner in
second standard was too subjective."0
Blakely pled to a lesser offense in order to avoid the charge of firstdegree kidnapping, but his enhanced sentence was essentially the same
Petitioner's enhanced sentence
as the first-degree kidnapping.81
exceeded the maximum by almost seventy percent, and the majority
2
argued the judge went "too far" in imposing that sentence.
The Court held that Blakely's sentencing procedure violated the Sixth
3
Justice Scalia
Amendment; therefore, his sentence was invalid.
cautioned that the Court's decision did not invalidate determinate
4
sentencing schemes, which fix sentences for a certain length of time.
The decision in Blakely illustrated how to implement constitutionally
sound, determinate sentencing schemes.8 5

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2537 n.6.
at 2538 n.9.
at 2539.

at 2540.
at 2543.
at 2540.
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While there were no concurring opinions, four Justices voiced
dissents.8 6 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist in her
dissent, argued that the majority's decision imposed significant costs and
could result in every nuance of a case being tried before a jury. 7
Abiding by Blakely could mean separate trials, first for the guilt phase
and then for character evidence presented at sentencing. 88 Moreover,
O'Connor contended that, under Blakely, trial or post-trial behavior
cannot be considered by a judge without a separate trial even if the
legislature desired for such behavior to be taken into consideration by
the sentencing judge.8 9 Ultimately, O'Connor argued that without
allowing a judge to find facts, there was no check on the jury's verdict. 90
Justice Kennedy argued for an additional reason not mentioned by
O'Connor in his dissent. 91 The Constitution establishes a system of
three branches that work interdependently. According to Kennedy, the
majority's decision does not uphold this interdependency because it
restrains experienced judges.9 2
Justice Breyer's dissent argued that the majority's holding works a
detriment to criminal defendants who plead guilty because those
defendants can no longer argue sentencing factors to a judge.93 Breyer
contended that he does not believe the Sixth Amendment guarantees
that a jury is to find facts about sentencing factors in the same way a
jury is constitutionally required to find facts about elements of an
offense. 94 Breyer reasoned that judges should have this ability to use
their own judgment and find sentencing factors because "that is what
judges are there for."95
In the majority opinion, Scalia addressed the dissenting arguments.96
He argued that defendants are not deprived of the opportunity to put
sentencing factors before a judge because defendants can still waive the
Apprendi right of submitting facts to a jury and either stipulate facts or
consent to judicial factfinding.97 Additionally, the majority reasoned,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2534 (O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
2546 (O'Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
2548.
2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2550-51 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2560 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2540.
2541.
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a defendant has the option of plea bargaining."8 Regarding the
existence of political checks in the form of sentencing judges, as
discussed by O'Connor, Scalia responded that the Sixth Amendment is
evidence of the constitutional framers' reluctance to trust the government in the area of sentencing.99 Finally, Scalia contended that while
O'Connor strongly argued against the majority's decision, she did not
offer an understandable alternative meaning of the jury trial guarantee. 100
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington' °' invalidated petitioner's sentence because his sentencing did not comply with the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. °2
This decision is important for several reasons. The Court expressed
the "need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial' 1 3 and
cautioned that its decision did not hold determinate sentencing schemes
unconstitutional." 4 Rather, the majority showed support for the policy
objectives of determinate schemes such as parity among defendants and
proportionality between the sentence and the offense. 105 In addition,
Justice Scalia specifically noted that this decision did not express an
opinion on the federal sentencing guidelines. 10 6
Justice O'Connor's dissent pointed to three consequences of the
majority's decision: first, the majority casts "constitutional doubt" over
sentencing guidelines of many states; second, the decision calls into
question criminal judgments since Apprendi; and third, the decision does
not resolve several practical questions, such as whether courts could
apply the guidelines to mitigating factors.' 7
Justice Breyer's dissent also outlined ramifications of the majority's
holding. Because defendants cannot argue for lower sentences in front
of a judge as a result of Blakely, Breyer predicted prosecutors will have
08
increased power as defendants rely more on plea bargaining.
Furthermore, Breyer fears the potential for legislatures to rewrite codes

98. Id.
99. Id. at 2539 n.10.
100. Id. at 2537 n.6.
101. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
102. Id. at 2538.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2540.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2538 n.9.
107. Id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and impose higher statutory sentences since judges may no longer
upwardly adjust sentences based on aggravating facts. 1"9
Prior to Apprendi, a defendant faced the possibility of having a
sentencingjudge, without warning, increase the maximum sentence from
"as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment" based on nothing
more than a post-trial probation report, the facts of which were not
found by a jury.11° The Apprendi rule sought to alleviate sentencing
injustices that occurred as a result of this judicial sentencing discretion.
Following Blakely, which applied the inherited rule of Apprendi, it
appears that judges have lost even more of their pre-Apprendi power and
cannot find sentencing factors, with the exception of prior convictions,
unless the defendant consents to judicial factfinding. This rule has
produced many questions of procedure and compliance resulting in
confused courts and prosecutors."
A cry for help was made and heard, and the Court responded on the
opening day of its October Term, 2004, by hearing oral arguments in a
combined case that addressed the applicability of Blakely to the federal
sentencing guidelines. 112 The Court appeared to be on the brink of
either eliminating the guidelines altogether or taking a less extreme
alternative of "Blakely-izing" the guidelines, meaning criminal indictments would have to include all sentencing factors before being
presented to juries." 3 Either alternative seemed to impose a significant burden on juries by requiring them to wade through even more
complex facts and indictments.
The Court's January 12, 2005 ruling in United States v.Booker, the
combined case, only partially solved the Blakely dilemmas of application." 4 The five to four decision held that the federal sentencing
guidelines, previously mandatory, are now only advisory in order to
comply with the Sixth Amendment."5 This decision, however, left
other Blakely questions unanswered, such as how to avoid sentencing
inconsistencies that may result from Booker's apparent partial grant of
judicial discretion; judges, arguably, and ironically, seem to have more
sentencing power now that they are not bound by the federal guidelines'

109. Id. at 2558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2542.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (2004) (holding that Blakely does
not apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238
(2004) (certifying questions of Blakely compliance).
112. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
113. Tony Mauro, Court May Scrap Federal Sentencing System, LEGAL TIMES,Oct. 11,
2004, at 1-2.
114. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746, 749-50.
115. Id. at 756-57.
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maximum and minimum limits.'18 Courts will carry on sentencing as
sentencing guidelines in a
they wait on Congress to redraft the federal
117
way that upholds the Sixth Amendment.
The Blakely majority favored a stricter interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment in order to preserve the jury trial right, but the application
of this decision could create judicial inefficiency. The court system
divides the labor of sentencing between experienced judges and less
experienced juries. Judges rather than juries impose sentences because
they know more about the law and appropriate punishments. Juries
find facts. Prior to Blakely, a judge was authorized to find some facts
relevant to sentencing as long as there was only a nominal effect on the
sentence as a result of that factfinding. Blakely removed nearly all of
the factfinding tools a judge has, which are few, and put those tools in
the hands of the inexperienced jury. Judges are left to build sentences
without the appropriate tools. Apprendi seemed to strike a meaningful
balance between Sixth Amendment preservation and judicial economy,
but Blakely upset that balance by taking away reasonable sentencing
power from judges. Booker apparently returns that power but, at the
same time, takes away the mandatory sentencing tools of the federal
sentencing guidelines.
Criminal defendants and their
Blakely has other implications.
attorneys may be less likely to shop for favorable judges because a postBlakely era could give judges less power in the sentencing phase.
Instead, juries may wield more power, which makes jury selection and
attorney case presentation even more significant. The importance of
having carefully-selected juries could increase the time and cost of voir
dire processes, thus affecting both defendants and society. Furthermore,
attorneys may feel more pressure to zealously advocate for their clients
since persuasion and presentation may influence a sentencing jury in a
way that would have been less persuasive to a sentencing judge. This
influence may evolve attorneys' courtroom style and method as attorneys'
sentencing message is essentially crafted for one primary audience-the
jury.
Because of their typical experience in sentencing procedures,
sentencing judges probably did not require much, or any, explanation of
sentencing factors. A jury, however, requires thorough explanation, a
process that must be repeated for each new jury in each new case. The
time and cost of this lengthy explanation, which for some complex cases
could take several days, will place a higher burden on attorneys, who

116. Tony Mauro, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Held Advisory, Not Mandatory, 179 N.J.
L.J. 158 (2005).
117. Id. at 2.
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must provide the explanation, and jurors, who have less incentive to
serve on jury duty as the time commitment'increases. With all of these
implications in mind, the debate, aside from the Booker decision, focuses
on the values of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial versus
efficiency.
Justice O'Connor predicted that Blakely would create "havoc" in trial
courts across the country.11 Indeed, judicial interpretation of Blakely
indicated a split of opinion on how the decision should be applied,
especially to the federal sentencing guidelines. Congress even issued a
resolution urging the Supreme Court to "resolve the ...

confusion and

inconsistency" caused by Blakely."9 The Court has partially responded
to the confusion with its decision in Booker, which makes the federal
sentencing guidelines advisory, but many questions remain unanswered.
Until the Supreme Court rules more specifically on how Blakely and
Booker should be applied, it is up to the courts to establish their own
guidelines in compliance with interpreted understandings of these cases.
REBECCA

118. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549.
119. S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Cong. (2004).
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